Croydon Council

REPORT TO:	ETHICS COMMITTEE		
	7 MARCH 2019		
SUBJECT:	USE OF THE POWERS AVAILABLE UNDER THE		
OODOLO1.	REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000		
	YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2018		
LEAD OFFICER:	JACQUELINE HARRIS BAKER		
	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF RESOURCES AND		
	MONITORING OFFICER		
CABINET MEMBER:	COUNCILLOR HAMIDA ALI		
	CABINET MEMBER FOR SAFER CROYDON AND COMMUNITIES		
WARDS:	ALL		
CORPORATE PRIORITY/POLICY CONTEXT: Monitoring compliance with the			
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act supports the Council's approach to corporate governance.			
FINANCIAL IMPACT: Implementation of the recommendations contained in this			
report shall be contained within existing budgets.			
FORWARD PLAN KEY DECISION REFERENCE NO: This is not a key decision.			
For general release			

1. RECOMMENDATION

The Committee is asked to note the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by the Council over the past calendar year.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 The purpose of this report is to inform the Committee how the powers available to the Council under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) have been used over the last calendar year.

3. DETAIL

3.1 RIPA legislates for the use by local authorities of covert methods of surveillance and information gathering to assist the detection and prevention of crime in relation to an authorities core functions. Evidence obtained by any covert surveillance could be subject to challenges under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) - the right to respect for private and family life. However, properly authorised covert surveillance under RIPA makes lawful what might otherwise be a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR and protects the

Council from any civil liability. A public authorities "core functions" are the specific public functions it undertakes when providing services, in contrast to the "ordinary functions" which are those undertaken by all authorities (e.g. employment issues, contractual arrangements etc.). Therefore a public authority may only engage in the use of RIPA when in performance of its "core functions".

- 3.2 Using RIPA, but only for the purpose of investigating crime and disorder, the Council is able to:
 - · Carry out covert directed surveillance;
 - Use covert human intelligence sources; and/or
 - Acquire data relating to communications (e.g. telephone subscriber information).
- 3.3 'Covert' in this context means carried out in a manner calculated to ensure that those subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place. It usually involves personal observation, the use of CCTV, or accessing communications data such as mobile phone number subscriber or website details. However, even using these powers, the Council cannot carry out intrusive surveillance, such as putting a hidden camera in a suspect's home to observe them, or listening to or obtaining the contents of telephone call or emails; such intrusive surveillance can only be carried out by the Police and government security services.
- 3.4 Further, even where the covert investigations are for the purpose of preventing crime and disorder, the Council must also show that the surveillance is necessary and proportionate and can be balanced against an individual's right to their private and family life.
- 3.5 Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) are individuals who by the nature of the situation they are in are able to provide information in a covert manner to aid an investigation. The use of CHIS is very tightly controlled under RIPA and historically the Council has not made use of this aspect of RIPA.
- 3.6 It should also be noted that in respect of communications data, no information regarding the actual content of the communication can be obtained by a local authority. The information obtained is information regarding who pays the bill for a phone, website or where an item of post originated etc. This type of information is most often obtained as part of a Trading Standards investigation where, for example, they are trying to identify and/or locate a trader in counterfeit goods operating from a website, or rogue trader who has billed (often a vulnerable) person for work and where the only point of contact is via a mobile phone number.
- 3.7 Local Authorities require judicial approval from a Court for the use of covert directed surveillance, CHIS and access to communications data (i.e. billing and subscriber information). The use of RIPA to authorising directed surveillance is generally limited to cases where the offence under investigation carries the possibility of minimum custodial sentence of 6 months or more being passed on conviction.

3.8 Overall supervision of the Council's use of RIPA lies with the Executive Director of Resources including day to day monitoring of and advice on authorisations, to ensure that the issues of necessity and proportionality are fully considered and to ensure that all applications meet the necessarily high standard that is required. The application is then made to the Magistrates' Court.

4.0 USE OF POWERS AVAILABLE UNDER RIPA

- 4.1 The occasions and outcomes where the use of the powers available under RIPA to aid the following investigations listed below were authorised during 2018.
 - Directed Surveillance None; and
 - Communications Data Requests, as detailed below:

Applicant	Purpose (Number of)	Outcome
Environmental Enforcement	Fly-tipping x 2	Both investigations completed (1 no useful information obtained / 1 investigation unable to be proceeded with.)
Trading Standards	Consumer Protection (door step crime) x1	Live investigation
Tenancy Investigations	Subletting x1	Live investigation

4.2 The Council's use of these powers, its policy and procedures where subject to inspection and audit by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office. During these inspections individual applications and authorisations were closely examined and Authorising Officers are interviewed by the inspectors.

5. FINANCIAL AND RISK ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5.1 There are no direct financial implications arising from this report.

6. LEGAL CONSIDERATION

6.1 There are no direct legal consequences arising from the contents of this report beyond those set out in the body of the report.

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BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS: Exempt